COMBATTING MONEY LAUNDERING AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:
DOES THE USA PATRIOT ACT REQUIRE THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM TO ABANDON
FUNDAMENTAL DUE PROCESS IN THE NAME OF HOMELAND SECURITY?

Joan M. O’Sullivan-Butler
“‘Q: If al Qaeda incorporates in Delaware then its assets cannot be blocked?’
A: The people involved are not al Qaeda.’”
-- Exchange between U.S. Judge Frank Easterbrook of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and Frank Simmons, the attorney for
Global Relief Foundation during oral argument1
According to findings by the International Monetary Fund, it is estimated that
money laundering amounts to between approximately two to five percent of global gross
domestic product or about $600 billion per year.2 In the aftermath of the events of
September 11, 2001, it has become increasingly apparent that “money laundering, and the
defects in financial transparency on which money laundering rely, are critical to
financing global terrorism and providing funds for terrorist attacks.”3 The immediate
response to the terrorist attacks of September 11 within the United States was a wave of
legislation, including the USA PATRIOT Act (the “Act”), which reshaped national
security policies while simultaneously restricting traditional civil liberties.4 Among the
many terrorism-related provisions of the Act, the executive branch was given authority to
freeze the assets of organizations -- in which there is a foreign interest suspected of
funding terrorist organizations – through the use of an asset blocking order pending a
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further investigation. The Act further permits the use of classified information which will
be subjected to only ex parte, in camera inspection by the judge presiding over a
challenge to such an action as a means of supporting the government’s actions in freezing
such assets.
While the use of secret evidence is normally something to be avoided, federal law
currently allows its use in exceptional cases. Asset-blocking cases such as Global Relief
Foundation, Inc. v. O’Neil et al., the governm ent has argued, represent precisely some of
those “exceptional circumstances” when secret evidence must be permitted.5
Furthermore, the government argues: “[t]he ongoing efforts to identify foreign terrorists
and their supporters depends in part on the use of intelligence that, if disclosed, could
cause grave damage to the national security of the United States.”6 Recently, however,
the use of this secret evidence has been challenged by the parties affected by such
blocking orders as an unconstitutional action that frequently leaves their own attorneys
“working in the dark” and unable to effectively challenge the government’s allegations.7
Further, recent efforts by some members of Congress to make the USA PATRIOT
Act permanent, and even increase the government’s powers of domestic intelligence
gathering, surveillance and prosecution are a source of concern within both the
government and the private sector.8 The PATRIOT II, or the “Domestic Security
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Enhancement Act of 2003” as the draft legislation is more formally known, would make
permanent many of the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act which were initially subject
to a sunset provision in 2005 when the legislation was initially approved.9 However,
many congressional Democrats and civil rights activists alike have indicated their
increasing frustration with the lack of information from the Justice Department on
whether or not those powers have been abused.10
The main question, therefore, in light of the terrorist attacks of September 11 and
the US government’s attempt to combat money laundering as a source of potential
terrorist funding, is whether the government’s use of secret evidence to justify a
challenged blocking order represents a violation of the fundamental due process rights of
the aggrieved party. In an attempt to evaluate this issue, the remainder of this essay is
divided into four Parts. Part I provides an overview of the connection between money
laundering and terrorism. Part II describes the statutory history and legislative
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background to the money laundering provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, as well as
how the Act’s provisions raise due process concerns in the context of judicial
proceedings challenging a blocking order issued by the US government. Part III
examines the rapidly developing body of legal precedent emerging from recent
challenges to such blocking orders and the Government’s efforts to enforce such orders
through the submission of “confidential and sensitive” evidence on an ex parte, in
camera basis. Part IV examines the legal and public policy arguments, both in favor of
and against the continued use of such ex parte, in camera evidence as a part of judicial
proceedings challenging blocking orders as well as some of the potential ramifications of
such a course of action. What emerges from this analysis is the determination that while
the provisions of the Act relating to the ex parte, in camera submission of evidence
supporting the government’s allegations are alarming at first glance, the ultimate goal of
cracking down on money laundering as an increasingly potent source of terrorist
financing can only be supported by broad enforcement capabilities held in check by the
unbiased members of the judiciary.
I.

The Money Laundering and Terrorism Connection
In the United States, money laundering is defined as a series of legitimate or

illegitimate financial transactions used to disguise the source of illicit funds. Money
laundering includes the use of legitimate funds to facilitate a criminal activity, such as
terrorism.11 The volume of global money laundering is estimated at roughly $590 billion

around the Fourth Amendment in the regular law enforcement context while the public remains
largely in the dark about every aspect of FISA warrants. See id.
11
See Robert E. Sims, Money Laundering and Corruption: Enforcement After September
11th, Presentation to American Bar Association Center for Continuing Legal Education (March
21-22, 2002).
4

to $1.5 trillion per year.12 The primary source of these laundered funds worldwide is
drug trafficking and financial crimes, such as bank fraud and credit card fraud. Money
laundering also supports a wide array of other criminal activities such as terrorism and
arms trafficking.13 As an activity that involves such a staggering amount of money,
money laundering poses a significant threat to national security and poses major foreign
policy risks. The potentially hazardous effects of money laundering include the
facilitation of official corruption, the distortion of markets and the destabilization of the
economies of developing countries.14
Money laundering that occurs in connection with terrorism poses unique
challenges. First, it should be noted that there are several similarities between terrorist
groups and organized crimes. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the leading
international anti-money laundering organization, recently reported that terrorist
organizations rely on the same sources of funding that organized crime groups utilize,
such as drug trafficking, fraud, extortion and kidnapping, and likewise utilize similar
methods to launder funds, such as nominee accounts, shell companies and numbered
bank accounts.15
However, there are also some important distinctions between terrorist groups and
individuals involved in organized crime. Terrorists do not generally pursue financial
goals. Terrorists do not consider the generation of revenue as one of their main goals and
usually do not attempt to launder substantial sums of money or engage in traditionally
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suspicious transactions.16 For example, the terrorists who carried out the World Trade
Center attacks required only approximately $500,000 in funding.17 Furthermore, the
efforts to fund those individuals involved only one transaction that generated a suspicious
activity report.18
Funds used for terrorism are difficult to detect for a number of reasons. First,
terrorists frequently utilize underground banking systems available in certain countries.19
Second, the funds used to support these individuals are not large amounts of money and
may include superficially legitimate sources of funding such as charitable organizations
and legitimate businesses. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has identified the funding
of terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and Hamas through charitable organizations
as a “significant challenge to law enforcement” and has therefore made such
organizations a prime focus of terrorist financial investigations. 20 According to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), such organizations offer terrorists “logistical
support in the form of cover employment, false documentation, travel facilitation, and
training.”21 As many critics of the PATRIOT Act point out, the “line is often blurred”
between terrorist fund-raising and legitimate fund-raising.22 Nevertheless, even those
efforts which appear on the surface to “help the poor” may fall squarely into the realm of
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logistical support for terrorist activity.23 As a result, any successful attempt to combat
money laundering as a source of terrorist funding necessarily requires broader
enforcement capabilities than those efforts used to combat typical money laundering
schemes.
II.

USA PATRIOT Act: Statutory Framework and Legislative History
Current efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist funding are best

understood in the context of historical development of the presidential powers over
foreign affairs.
A.

Early History and the Trading with the Enemy Act

The source of the President’s power over foreign affairs, and hence the ability to
combat global money laundering, is a long-standing issue since no explicit presidential
affairs power is written in the Constitution. Instead, the power over foreign affairs is
deemed to be an inherent power of the President in his role of Commander in Chief. In
an effort to strengthen the President’s foreign affairs powers, the United States Congress
enacted legislation empowering the President with broad authority to deal with foreign
sovereigns in times of war and national emergency. This early legislation was the
Trading with the Enemy Act (“TWEA”) as enacted in 1917 and amended in 1933. The
TWEA granted the President authority to “investigate, regulate … prevent or prohibit
…transactions” in times of war or national emergency.24 The TWEA employed the use
of economic sanctions as its primary tool to deal with foreign affairs.
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Of the several early cases addressing the President’s foreign affairs power,
perhaps the most famous is United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corporation.25 In
Curtis-Wright, a joint Congressional resolution authorizing the President to ban the sale
of arms to countries engaged in a Bolivian conflict was challenged as an
unconstitutionally broad delegation of legislative power to the president. In upholding
the resolution, the court reasoned that “it is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of
our international relations, embarrassment, perhaps serious embarrassment, is to be
avoided and success for our aim achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made
effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord
to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which
would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.”26 However, as the need
for more extensive foreign policy powers increased, in times of peace as well as in times
of war, the need for more in depth legislation to address the scope of the President’s
authority became apparent.
B.

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act

In 1977, Congress amended the TWEA and enacted the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) to delineate the President’s exercise of emergency
economic powers in response to both wartime and peacetime crises. The TWEA
specifically governed “the President’s authority to regulate international economic
transactions during wars or national emergencies.”27 The 1977 legislation granted the
President broad emergency powers in wartime under the TWEA, and granted similar
although not identical emergency economic powers in peacetime national emergencies
25
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under the IEEPA.28 More specifically, following the declaration of a national emergency,
the IEEPA provides the President with the authorization to:
investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or
prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer,
withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in,
or exercising any right, power or privilege with respect to, or
transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a
national thereof has any interest…by any person, or with respect to
any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.29
In essence, the IEEPA granted the President nearly complete but temporary
authority to control the actions of any economic actor subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States in the event of a national emergency.
C.

Post-September 11 Action: Executive Order 13224

On September 24, 2002, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order
13224, declaring a national emergency with respect to the “grave acts of terrorism and
threats of terrorism committed by foreign terrorists . . . and the immediate threat of
further attacks on United States nationals or the United States.”30 The Executive Order
specifically noted that “because of the pervasiveness and expansiveness of the financial
foundation of foreign terrorists, financial sanctions may be appropriate for those foreign
persons that support or otherwise associate with these foreign terrorists.”31 More
importantly, however, “because of the ability to transfer funds or assets instantaneously,
prior notice to such persons of measures to be taken pursuant to this order would render
these measures ineffectual. . . . [F]or these measures to be effective in addressing the
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national emergency declared in this order, there need be no prior notice of a listing or
determination made pursuant to this order.”32
Executive Order 13224 was not the first executive order directed towards
combating money laundering as a source of terrorist funding. For instance, on January
25, 1995, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12947 in an effort to crack down on
funding to the Islamic Resistance movement, more commonly known as “Hamas.” 33
That Order blocked all property and interests in property of the terrorist organization and
persons designated in the Order.34 The Order also permitted the Secretary of the
Treasury to designate additional individuals if they are found to be “owned or controlled
by, or to act for or on behalf of” an entity designated in the Order.35
However, Executive Order 13224 represents the broadest definition of what
constitutes the money laundering used to fund terrorist efforts. Under the Executive
Order, the President invoked the IEEPA to name twenty-seven terrorists, terrorist
organizations and their supporters, and froze their assets that were in the United States,
that would be coming into the United States, or that were in the “possession or control”
of U.S. persons.36 The order also authorized the Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, to designate
individuals or entities whose property or property interests should be blocked because
they “act for or on behalf of” or are “owned or controlled by” designated terrorists or they
“assist in, sponsor, or provide…support for” or are associated with them.37 The order
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thereby expanded the definition of what actions constitute money laundering used to fund
terrorist efforts to include any act which could be broadly construed to constitute
assisting, sponsoring or providing support for terrorist groups.38 This broad definition of
what constitutes money laundering used to fund terrorist efforts also carried over to the
enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act.
D.

The USA PATRIOT Act

In a more formal response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
Congress enacted the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, also known as the USA
PATRIOT Act.39 Passed in October 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act significantly expands
the President’s power under the IEEPA. Previously, an individual or entity whose assets
had been blocked could follow a procedure through which they were entitled to seek
reconsideration of the blocking order if the party believed the order had been issued in
error. However, the USA PATRIOT Act provides that in cases of judicial review of a
blocking order entered pursuant to the IEEPA, any classified information upon which the
order was based “may be submitted to the reviewing court ex parte and in camera.”40
The new statutory framework enacted after September 11th focuses not only on
the blocking of questionable assets, but also on the global problem of money laundering
and how money laundering schemes are used by terrorists and their supporters. Due to
the “pervasiveness and expansiveness of the financial foundation of foreign terrorists,”
Executive Order 13224 instructed the executive agencies of the United States to utilize all
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legal means to stem the flow of money supporting terrorist organizations throughout the
world.41
The statutory framework of the USA PATRIOT Act provides further support for
this firm mandate and makes significant changes in the fight against money laundering.
Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act, the “International Money Laundering Abatement and
Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001” was signed into law on October 26, 2001.42 The
purpose of Title III is to “increase the strength of United States measures to prevent,
detect, and prosecute international money laundering and the financing of terrorism.”43
Title III requires the Secretary of the Treasury to implement numerous changes and
triggers new compliance requirements for financial institutions, large corporations,
charities, non-governmental organizations and even attorneys.44 In particular, Title III
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sets new conditions to do business in the United States for foreign financial institutions
with assets in the United States.45
Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act represents Congress’ focus on the necessity of
developing strategies to fight domestic and international money laundering, and in doing
so expands the ability of law enforcement authorities to fight money laundering. For the
first time, the law gives the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) access to Suspicious
Activity Reports (“SARs”), including those involving bank accounts of U.S. citizens.46
Congress was particularly concerned with weaker foreign countries that allow the use of
anonymous offshore banking facilities and the illicit movement of funds that are normally
used in organized crime, smuggling, and terrorism. Congress was also concerned with the
use of private and correspondent banking services to move illicit funds.47
Title III addresses Congress’s concerns by expanding the U.S. anti-money
laundering laws in three main areas. First, the law expands the list of crimes that may be
used to serve as predicate offenses for money laundering crimes. Predicate offenses now
include additional Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) predicate
offenses,48 foreign crimes, including all crimes of violence, foreign public corruption,
offenses for with the United States would be required to extradite the offender,49
operation of an illegal money remission business,50 and bulk cash smuggling in amounts
greater than $10,000 into or out of the United States.51
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Second, the Act focuses attention on U.S. financial institutions which are now
required to take “special measures” when dealing with foreign countries or institutions
that are considered to be of “primary money laundering concern.”52 U.S. financial
institutions are now required to strictly regulate the relationships between U.S.
institutions and foreign banks and individuals and to develop compliance programs to
enable such action to take place.53 Title III further requires banks to conduct enhanced
due diligence measures for private banking and correspondence accounts54 and prohibits
United States banks from maintaining correspondent accounts with foreign “shell
banks.”55
Finally, the Act expands the procedural tools that can be used by federal courts
and law enforcement in prosecuting money laundering crimes. In particular, the 2001
Money Laundering Act expands the federal government’s authority for asset forfeiture.56
A new provision, Title 18, Section 981, expands the federal government’s forfeiture
authority by allowing the civil forfeiture of any person, entity or any property engaged in
terrorism.57 Specifically the provision authorizes the forfeiture of any property
“affording any person a source of influence over such entity or organization” where the
assets or property were “acquired or maintained by any person with the intent and for the
purpose of supporting, planning, conducting or concealing” an act of terrorism against
52
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U.S. persons or property, or which were “derived from, involved in, or used or intended
to be used” to commit such acts.58 The government can also forfeit the property of an
individual convicted of an international terrorism offense and the proceeds or
instrumentalities used to commit the predicate money laundering offense.59
Although the changes to the U.S. money laundering laws are significant, Title III
may not fully address some of the most difficult issues in the fight against money
laundering, namely informal financial transactions. Since September 11, the role of
informal financial transactions and their significance on the funding of terrorism has
received major attention. One of the major areas under scrutiny is the use of charitable
organizations as a way to launder money and fund terrorist groups. The Bush
Administration has consistently expanded the scope of its Executive Orders to include
charitable organizations and other controversial targets.60 The plethora of charitable
organizations and other groups with contacts in the Middle East and third world
countries, both those attempting to provide genuine humanitarian aid and those with less
noble motives, create enormous potential for mistaken identities which could lead to
mistaken seizures and asset blocking under the new laws. As a result, a number of
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organizations have raised questions about whether the new laws violate an affected
party’s fundamental due process rights.
III.

Due Process and the USA PATRIOT Act in Action
Lawsuits filed by three such organizations are particularly instructive regarding

the constitutionality of the government’s use of secret evidence in terrorist-funding cases.
In December 2001, the Treasury Department froze the assets of two Chicago-based
charities, Global Relief Foundation and Benevolence International Foundation, due to
their suspected terrorist links.61 Notably, unlike other individuals who were officially
designated as supporters of terrorism and then subjected to financial sanctions, the assets
of both Global Relief Foundation and Benevolence International Foundation were frozen
pending the government’s investigation of their potential terrorist links.62 The Treasury
Department similarly froze the assets of Holy Land Foundation for Relief and
Development based on the group’s alleged support of Hamas, a Palestinian militant
organization.63 As discussed more fully below, all three groups subsequently denied any
terrorist ties and filed federal lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the
government’s actions.
A.

Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development v. Ashcroft et al.

On March 11, 2002, Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (“Holy
Land”) filed a suit against John Ashcroft, in his official capacity as Attorney General of
the United States of America, and several other high-ranking government officials
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challenging the government’s designation of Holy Land as a terrorist organization.64 The
lawsuit also challenged the blocking of Holy Land’s assets by the government as
unconstitutional.65 Holy Land was started in 1989 as a non-profit charitable corporation
with its headquarters in Richardson, Texas. Shukri Abu Baker, Holy Land’s Chief
Executive Officer and co-founder, has dedicated the organization that provides
humanitarian aid throughout the world, with its primary focus as the provision of aid to
the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza areas.66
On December 4, 2001, the United States Department of the Treasury’s Office of
Foreign Asset Control (“OFAC”) designated Holy Land as a specially designated terrorist
organization and blocked all of Holy Land’s assets pursuant to the IEEPA.67 Holy Land
was so designated because of acts the organization had undertaken “for or on behalf of”
Hamas, a radical Palestinian group. The evidence on the record demonstrated that Holy
Land had early financial connections to Hamas, that Holy Land met with Hamas leaders,
funded Hamas controlled entities, and provided support to orphans of Hamas and to
families of Hamas martyrs and prisoners. In addition, unidentified FBI informant reports
showed that Holy Land funded Hamas.68
Holy Land subsequently filed a lawsuit against the government seeking to enjoin
the government from continuing to block or otherwise interfere with the organization’s
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access to, or disposition of, its assets.69 Holy Land alleged that the blocking of its assets
violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), the First, Fourth and Fifth
Amendments of the Constitution, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”).
Holy Land also alleged that the evidence submitted by the government did not support
OFAC’s determination.70 On May 31, 2002, the government moved for summary
judgment on the APA claim and moved to dismiss the remaining constitutional and
RFRA claims.71 The government also filed a motion to submit classified evidence in
camera and ex parte in support of their motions. On August 8, 2002, the court ruled in
favor of the government on all claims.72 Since that date, Holy Land has been effectively
shut down and ceased its operations.
B.

Global Relief Foundation, Inc. v. O’Neill et al.

Global Relief Foundation, Inc. (“Global Relief”) is an Islamic humanitarian relief
organization and a domestic, non-profit corporation headquartered in Illinois that began
operating in 1992. Global Relief claims it is also the largest U.S.-based Islamic
charitable organization with active programs in distributing food, funding schools and
orphanages, and providing medical service throughout the Middle East and Europe.73
Over ninety percent of Global Relief’s donations are sent overseas to fund charitable
activities. In order to distribute the humanitarian aid abroad, Global Relief has
established offices in Belgium, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan.74

69
70
71

72
73

74

See id. at 64.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 62.
See Global Relief Foundation, Inc. v. O’Neil, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779 (N.D.Ill.).
See id
18

Shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, then-acting Deputy Attorney
General Larry D. Thompson authorized the search of Global Relief’s Illinois office and
the residence of its executive director, Mohammed Chehade. On December 14, 2001, the
FBI’s Chicago Division Joint Terrorism Task Force searched Global Relief’s offices and
the executive director’s home.75 The items seized in these searches included records,
computers, cellular phones, a credit card imprinter, receipts, palm pilots, and both US and
foreign currency.76
Simultaneously on December 14, 2001, the Department of the Treasury’s Office
of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) issued a “Blocking Notice and Requirement to
Furnish Information” with respect to Global Relief pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”).77 The notice blocked the funds, accounts
and business records of Global Relief pending the FBI’s further investigation into the
possible relationship that Global Relief may have to the World Trade Center attacks and
the Al Qaeda network.78 OFAC asserted that its actions were based on substantial
amounts of classified and unclassified information relating to Global Relief’s possible
connections with terrorist cells.79
On January 28, 2002, Global Relief filed a Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief and for a Writ of Mandamus naming high-ranking government officials as the
defendants.80 Global Relief’s Petition challenged the constitutionality of the
government’s actions blocking Global Relief’s assets pursuant to the IEEPA and
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requested that the government be ordered to “unfreeze” its assets and return the items
seized in the FBI’s search.81 Two weeks later, Global Relief filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction that argued that the temporary freezing of assets was
unconstitutional and unlawful.82 The government replied by asking the court to deny
Global Relief’s motions and to grant the government’s motion to submit ex parte, in
camera evidence in support of its actions.83 Among the evidence the government sought
to present in secret were records presented to OFAC that led to the freezing of Global
Relief’s assets and the application for a search warrant for Global Relief’s headquarters.84
The court ruled in favor of the government on all counts. The court found that the
IEEPA, as modified by the USA Patriot Act, Section 1702(a)(1)(B) permits the President
to “block during the pendency of an investigation…any acquisition, holding,
withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of …
any right, power, or privilege with respect to any property in which any foreign country
or a national thereof has any interest by any person…subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.”85 It is clear, the court noted, that Congress intended for the President to
have sweeping powers to regulate questionable property at the time of a national
emergency.86 This power included the ability to block domestic assets of either a
domestic corporation or a U.S. individual pending investigation when a foreign national
or foreign country has an interest in those assets.87 As Global Relief is operated and
controlled by foreign nationals, with foreign as well as domestic offices, and the
81
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overwhelming majority of its charitable donations are for relief overseas, the court found
that both foreign nationals and foreign countries have the most interest in this
corporation.88 Based on the plain language of the IEEPA, the court found that OFAC’s
Order blocking the assets as well as the search of the assets of Global Relief pending the
FBI investigation was proper. 89 Notably, however, the Court did not cite to the USA
PATRIOT Act as support for the government’s actions.90 Instead, the Court relied on the
language of the IEEPA statute and pre-existing case law – and declined to address the
constitutional issues raised by Global Relief’s challenge.91
C.

Benevolence International Foundation, Inc. v. Ashcroft, et al.

Finally, on January 30, 2002, Benevolence International Foundation
(“Benevolence International”) filed a lawsuit against Ashcroft and a number of other
high-ranking government officials92 in their official capacities challenging the
government’s seizure of Benevolence International’s property.93 Founded in 1992,
Benevolence International is a not-for-profit, charitable organization that has provided
several millions of dollars worth of humanitarian aid to several countries around the
world, including the United States.94 The organization’s charitable activities are often
conducted in partnership with international relief organizations such as the United States
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Agency for International Development, the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees, the United Nations World Food Programs, and the United Nations
International Children’s Emergency Fund.95
On December 14, 2001, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign
Assets Control (“OFAC”) issued Benevolence International a notice that the government
had reason to believe that Benevolence International was engaged in activities in
violation of the IEEPA.96 The letter further notified Benevolence International that the
government was blocking all of Benevolence International’s funds, accounts and business
records pending further investigation.97 On that same date, the FBI searched
Benevolence International’s offices in Palos Hills, Illinois and Newark, New Jersey.
These searches resulted in the seizure of all of Benevolence International’s financial
records, as well as other documents and personal property.98 A separate, but related
search was conducted that same day at the home of Benevolence International’s Chief
Executive Officer, Enaam Arnaout. During this search, a number of personal effects
were seized including family photographs, Arnaout’s citizenship papers, and a
microphone from his son’s Nintendo game.99
All of the searches were conducted pursuant to an Attorney General Emergency
Physical Search Authorization (“AGEPSA”) executed on December 14, 2001.
Benevolence International’s lawyers were not permitted to review the AGEPSA that day,
supposedly because it was a classified document. In fact, Benevolence International’s
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lawyers were not permitted to even read the AGEPSA until January 25, 2002.100 When
Benevolence International’s lawyers were finally permitted to review the AGEPSA,
Benevolence International discovered that the government was operating under what
Benevolence International believes is false information that Arnaout was actually “Samir
Abdul Motaleb.”101
Benevolence International’s lawyers subsequently challenged what they
characterized the government’s actions in “seizing the property, and blocking the
property and activities, of a law-abidingfaith -based charity engaged in critical
humanitarian work, without a hearing, without meaningful notice or opportunity for a
hearing, and without probable cause” as unconstitutional.102 Benevolence International’s
Complaint asserted claims for relief for violations of procedural due process, substantive
due process, taking without just compensation, and other First, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth
Amendment violations.103 On April 18, 2002, the government filed a motion to submit
evidence in camera and ex parte with the Court in support of their position in the case.104
Subsequently, on April 29, 2002, the United States Attorney filed criminal
charges against Benevolence International and Arnaout for “knowingly submitting false
material declarations under oath” in Benevolence International’s civil proceeding against
the government.105 The criminal charges were based on what the government maintained
were false affidavits submitted by Benevolence International and Arnaout that
“Benevolence International has never provided aid or support to people or organizations
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known to be engaged in violence, terrorist activities, or military operations of any
nature.”106 The government then successfully moved to stay discovery in Benevolence
International’s civil case against the government as a result of the criminal complaint
against Benevolence International and Arnaout.107 Both the civil and criminal cases are
currently pending before the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois.
IV.

Due Process and Ex Parte, In Camera Submissions of Evidence
As explained above, one of the more controversial provisions of the USA

PATRIOT Act is Title I, Section 106 that invokes the issue of property protection under
the Fifth Amendment. Section 106 greatly increases presidential authority over the
property or assets of foreign persons or organizations by amending Section 203 of the
International Emergency Powers Act, and permitting the submission of evidence in
support of the government’s action to the court on an ex parte, in camera basis.108
Specifically, Section 106(c) provides: “[I]n any judicial review of a determination made
under this section, if the determination was based on classified information (as defined in
section 1(a) of the Classified Information Procedures Act109) such information may be
submitted to the reviewing court ex parte and in camera. This subsection does not confer
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or imply any right to judicial review.”110 The Attorney General explained the perceived
need for this provision, stating that:
[l]aw enforcement must be able to ‘follow the money’ in order to identify
and neutralize terrorist networks. We need the capacity for more than a
freeze. We must be able to seize. Consistent with the President’s action
[seizing assets of identified groups and individuals allegedly associated
with al-Qaeda], our proposal gives law enforcement the ability to seize
their terrorist assets.111
However, it is well-established that both temporary and permanent aliens in the United
States enjoy a Fifth Amendment right to due process, a right that encompasses the right to
hold personal and real property. As a result, the proposition that the President may seize
and dispose of such assets apparently without the benefit of the type of meaningful
judicial review granted by the Fifth Amendment raises several questions.
The PATRIOT Act does not completely strip individuals accused of providing
material support to terrorists of any form of judicial review. In fact, judicial review of
asset blocking orders is available under Section 316(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act, which
provides that owners of confiscated property may file federal lawsuits challenging the
determination that the property was an asset of suspected terrorists.112 However, pursuant
to Section 316(b), the Federal Rules of Evidence may be suspended if the court
determines that compliance with the Federal Rules of Evidence could jeopardize national
110
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security interests.113 When faced with such a determination, the court is required to strike
a delicate balance between the need to protect the sanctity of confidential information
sources and the potential to undermine the right to a fair trial through a violation of the
aggrieved party’s right to fundamental due process. In each of the cases discussed in Part
III, the court was required to make that determination. An examination of the arguments,
both for and against the use of such evidence, is particularly instructive as to the
constitutionality of the use of secret evidence pursuant to Section 316(B) of the USA
PATRIOT Act.
A.

Arguments Against the Use of Secret Evidence

The fundamental theory underlying the briefs submitted by the plaintiffs in the
terrorist funding cases is that our adversarial system of jurisprudence requires that each
side be permitted to present its own evidence and rebut the other party’s evidence through
contrary evidence.114 However, the plaintiffs contend, that system is placed in jeopardy if
one party is allowed to present secret in camera evidence that the other party is unable to
examine, challenge and answer.115 The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the
argument that the ability to confront and respond to evidence is a fundamental right of
due process. Thus, with regard to the use of secret evidence:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our
jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action seriously
Id.
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injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact
findings, the evidence used to prove the Government’s case must be
disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is
untrue.116
Perhaps not surprisingly, the plaintiffs in the terrorist-funding cases strenuously argue
that the government’s attempt to submit evidence on an in camera, ex parte basis
constitutes just such a violation of their fundamental rights to due process.
One of the most persuasive cases in favor of the argument that the use of such
evidence violates fundamental due process rights was set out in the briefs submitted on
behalf of the plaintiff in Benevolence International. In particular, counsel for
Benevolence International argued that several prior courts had applied the basic
principles of due process -- in the context of the government’s use of secret evidence to
demonstrate the opposing party’s links to terrorism – and found that such evidence
violated due process. The fact that the government intended to argue that it was entitled
to summary judgment on the basis of that secret evidence further compounded the
problem. “The government cannot,” Benevolence International’s lawyers argued, “be
permitted to seize an American corporation’s assets indefinitely, never bring criminal or
civil charges, and obtain dismissal of the corporation’s suit for return of its property by
using “evidence” that the corporation cannot see or respond to.”117
Rather, under the application of the test set out in Mathews v. Eldridge,118 such an
action would clearly violate the involved individuals’ fundamental due process rights.
Under the standard set out by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, the minimum
requirements of due process include: (1) written notice of the specific charges against the
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party; (2) disclosure to the party of the evidence against it; (3) an opportunity to be heard
in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (4) the right to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses; (5) a neutral and detached hearing body; and (6) if
the hearing body rendered a decision adverse to the party, a written statement as to the
evidence relied on and the basis for the decision.119 Benevolence International’s
attorneys argued that the government clearly denied the charity a number of these
fundamental due process requirements. Benevolence International’s lawyers were
particularly concerned that over four months were permitted to pass without Benevolence
International being charged by the government with any offense.
Finally, even if the Court were to permit the use of secret evidence, lawyers for
the charities have argued that its use should be narrowly circumscribed to permit the
government to conceal its sources but also permitting the accused individual or
organization to learn the nature and contents of the evidence in question.120 Instead, the
charities contend, the introduction of secret evidence should not alter substantive or
procedural rules.121 If the government is permitted to rely on the submission of secret
evidence in support of actions taken under the PATRIOT Act, the government should be
required to file a Statement of Undisputed Facts with the court that would set out the facts
that the government contends the secret evidence proves in summary form.122 Once such
a submission is made to the court, the accused party will be able to evaluate all the
evidence, as the law requires.123
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The arguments set forth by the charities are not entirely unfounded. As a number
of lawyers who have litigated secret evidence cases in the past recently noted,124 there are
a number of cases where such close scrutiny has permitted defense attorneys enough
information to confront the evidence against their clients and ultimately to cause the
government’s charges against those individuals to fall apart.125 The most notable of these
cases involved Hany Kiareldeen, a Palestinian living in New Jersey who was detained
after he was accused of meeting with one of the men convicted of bombing the World
Trade Center in 1993.126 Upon closer examination of the “evidence” against him,
Kiareldeen came to suspect that the main source of the secret evidence was his ex-wife,
with whom he was involved in a bitter child-custody battle.127 When Kiareldeen brought
these suspicions to the attention of the federal judge in charge of his case, the judge
questioned both the government’s evidence against him and the process by which it was
presented.128 In particular, the court noted, it was concerned with “the integrity of the
adversarial process, the impossibility of self-defense against undisclosed charges, and the
reliability of government processes initiated and prosecuted in darkness.”129 As the
Kiareldeen case makes clear, even the opportunity to confront the evidence against an
individual in summary form can make a significant difference in the ability of an
individual to overcome the “evidence” brought against them.
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C.

Arguments in Favor of the Use of Secret Evidence

In response to the allegations raised by the charities in their lawsuits, the
government set forth a number of arguments in support of the contention that in camera
and ex parte consideration of classified evidence is both statutorily authorized and
constitutional. First, the government noted, both FISA and IEEPA expressly authorize
the Court’s acceptance of evidence on an ex parte, in camera basis. While the IEEPA
was amended by the PATRIOT Act to provide for the discretionary use of such evidence,
FISA has provided for the use of such evidence on a mandatory basis since its
enactment.130 Second, the government noted, the constitutionality of these provisions is
not in dispute. Courts have ruled on a number of occasions that ex parte, in camera
review of FISA materials is constitutional.131 Furthermore, while the charities’ argument
about the potential difficulties arising from such a procedure is well-taken, Congress was
fully aware of these potential difficulties and chose to resolve them through a method
other than requiring that all such evidence be disclosed.132
Finally, the government noted, courts have routinely approved the use of ex parte
classified information where, as here, national security concerns are implicated by the
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nature of an alleged offense, or where Congress has specifically authorized the court to
rely on such evidence.133 In the terrorist-funding cases, the government argued, national
security concerns were paramount in light of the events of September 11 and the U.S.
action in Afghanistan in reaction to those events.134 Congress was well aware of those
national security interests when it passed the USA PATRIOT Act to expressly recognize
the need for the government to utilize and rely on classified evidence under IEEPA.135
D.

Balancing the Public Interest And Fundamental Due Process Rights

The outrage and alarm expressed by critics of the PATRIOT Act’s authorization
of the use of secret evidence might lead one to believe that courts faced with challenges
to the Act’s constitutionality would overwhelmingly find in favor of the plaintiffs.
Notably, however, the courts in the terrorist-funding cases have been reluctant to hold
that ex parte, in camera submission of evidence by the government pursuant to Section
316 of the PATRIOT Act violates fundamental due process rights.136
Some courts have declined to address the issue, choosing to resolve the lawsuits
brought on behalf of the affected parties on other grounds. For instance, Judge Kessler of
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that the Holy Land Foundation
for Relief and Development’s allegations about the use of secret evidence by the
government in that case were “very significant and distressing.”137 At a preliminary
hearing addressing the issue of the government’s intention to utilize Section 316 ex parte
evidence, Judge Kessler stated: “the government will have a heavy burden to convince
me that they can submit material . . . ex parte . . . [I]n particular in a case with as many
133
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ramifications as this case, with as much public interest as has been demonstrated in this
case, I . . . feel particularly strongly that unless the law [is] crystal clear . . . everything
should be on the public record, so . . . that the public understands full well what we are
doing and the reasons for what we are doing.”138 Ultimately, Judge Kessler refused to
address the propriety of Section 316-type secret evidence, finding that it was not
necessary to reach the issue in resolving the case.139
Other courts, however, have addressed the issue directly. For instance, the Global
Relief court admitted that such proceedings are extraordinary events in our judicial
system because they deprive the parties against whom they are directed of the basic
requirements of due process.140 The Global Relief plaintiffs based their due process
claims on a theory that a party is guaranteed the right to confront the witness against
them. This right, which is provided by the Confirmation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment,141 is inapplicable to the terrorist financing cases because these cases do not
involve criminal sanctions. The parties also argued that they were deprived of notice
setting out the alleged misconduct and an opportunity for a hearing. Extraordinary events
such in camera submissions of the type utilized by the government in Global Relief are
clear violations of a party’s due process rights unless they are justified by compelling
state interests.142 In such a situation, the court must carefully balance the government’s
interest against those of the private party whose assets have been frozen.

137

See BIF Memo in Opp. at p. 15, n. 11 (discussing Judge Kessler’s remarks).
See id. at p. 15, n. 11.
139
See Holy Land Foundation for Relief & Development v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 64
n.3 (2002).
140
See id.
141
See e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-316 (1974).
142
See id.
138

32

Abiding by this mandate, the Global Relief court appropriately found that the
government sufficiently demonstrated that it would harm the national security of the
United States to disclose the evidence the government sought to submit ex parte and in
camera in support of freezing the charity’s assets while the government’s investigation
was pending.143 Further, the government had attempted to compensate for its inability to
disclose certain portions of the evidence against the charity by publicly filing four binders
of exhibits.144 The government’s confidentiality interest was particularly compelling
because the case involved the freezing of funds and examination of seized potential
evidence to further aid in the investigation.145
As demonstrated by the Global Relief court’s analysis, perhaps the most important
procedural safeguard justifying the government’s ability to submit evidence ex parte and
in camera is the court itself. Specifically, the unbiased judiciary is a tremendous asset to
an affected party when combating ex parte, in camera evidence submissions by the
government. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”146 As our
government’s most vigorous defenders of the Constitution, courts are tasked with
upholding the Fifth Amendment and ensuring that an affected party’s due process rights
remain intact.147 The mere submission of “secret” evidence in support of the
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government’s position does not prove the government’s argument automatically. Rather,
as finder of fact in an action challenging an asset blocking order, the court must weigh
the government’s evidence supporting the decision and determine the sufficiency of such
evidence. Furthermore, the court is loath to proceed without providing a party the right
to confront the evidence against them, and will act to ensure that any non-classified
evidence is produced to that party. In fact, the Global Relief court acted early in the
litigation to ensure that all documents of a non-classified nature were either provided or
returned to Global Relief on an on-going basis.148
Conclusion
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 resulted in an intense focus on money
laundering as a source of terrorist funding. As a result of this attention, new legislation
was enacted to increase government authorities’ ability to combat such money laundering
efforts. While this new legislation resulted in a necessary increase in governmental
enforcement capabilities, some critics question whether some of the provisions of these
new laws may have potentially dangerous ramifications for our judicial process. The
continued use of ex parte, in camera evidence as a part of judicial proceedings
challenging blocking orders pursuant to Section 316 of the USA PATRIOT Act has
drawn attention as one of the potentially dangerous ramifications of such a course of
action. However, while the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act relating to the
submission of in camera, ex parte evidence in support of the government’s allegations
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are alarming at first glance, it appears that the ultimate goal of combating money
laundering as an increasingly potent source of terrorist financing can and will only be
accomplished through the broad enforcement capabilities provided by the USA
PATRIOT Act held in check by the unbiased members of the judiciary.
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